We revisit the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis using 1987-1995 data for Chinese provinces. A comparison of off-sample (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004) predictions to actual emissions indicates that more stringent rules are still needed to fight industrial (waste water and dust) pollution. Auxiliary regressions show that conditional on income, northern provinces have lower industrial waste water pollution; non-coastal and provinces with smaller secondary industry shares have lower industrial (waste water, COD, and dust) pollution; provinces with smaller state-owned enterprises share have lower industrial COD pollution; and, commitment to control industrial dust pollution is correlated with local governments' budget balance.
I. Introduction
The market-oriented economic reforms that started in 1978 have greatly transformed the Chinese economy. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were allowed to operate and compete on free market principles, rather than under the direction and guidance of state planning; special economic zones were established along the coast for the purpose of attracting foreign direct investment, boosting exports, and importing high technology products; and, private enterprises were legalized and promoted. With these reforms, the average annual growth rate of China's real GDP was close to 10% from 1979 to 2005, compared to a pre-reform growth rate of around 5% from 1960 to 1978. No country has ever lifted more people out of poverty faster than China since the adoption of these reforms. However, economic growth in China has been accompanied by severe environmental deterioration. (2004) , the World Bank estimates that direct damages from pollution (e.g., medical bills) are 8-12% of China's annual GDP. The World Bank has identified 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world to be located in China. And, close to two-thirds of the 300 cities tested by China's environmental protection agency failed to meet the air quality standards set by the World Health Organization. With negligent environmental protection, some areas have such high levels of toxins in the air and groundwater that cancer levels are 15 to 30 times higher than the national figure (see Lynch 2005) .
According to The Economist
1 Unsustainable environmental practices also pose increasing threats to China's water, forests, biodiversity, and food and energy supplies.
Since China is a huge country, its pollution problems undoubtedly have serious negative effects on the global environment. Currently, forces that oppose more stringent rules and regulations in the name of free markets and economic growth are battling forces that favor greater environmental protection. It appears that the latter group is losing the battle. The general public and the central government tend to favor more stringent environmental rules while local governments do not. 3 The current central and local government tax revenue sharing scheme is one reason why local governments in China have little incentive to call for more stringent environmental policies. Since 1994, local governments have experienced budget deficits every year, and they have come to rely heavily on central government transfers. 4 These transfers are largely dependent on value-added tax rebates.
Since value-added tax rebates are related to local output increases, local governments in China have strong incentives to increase production (thereby increasing revenue transfers), 5 but have little incentive to protect the environment.
In this paper, we revisit the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) hypothesis. According to the EKC hypothesis, an inverted-U characterizes the income-emission relationship. 6 However, a number of studies (e.g., Millimet et al. 2003) have shown that a cubic relationship may exist between income and emissions. In particular, they may again be positively correlated at still higher income levels.
3 According to Cheng et al. (2007) , a recent survey indicates that 86% of the people are not satisfied with China's environmental protection; 70% of the people blame local governments for the environmental problems; and, 78% of the people indicate willingness to sacrifice the speed of growth for a better environment. 4 Even rich provinces largely depend on transfers from the central government to cover their budget deficits. For example in 2004, 42% of Shanghai's budgetary revenues are rebates from the central government; the rate for Jiangsu province is 48%. 5 Another reason is that Chinese local government officials are appointed by their superiors based mainly on local economic performance. 6 See Grossman and Krueger (1995) for an early contribution. One of the explanations for the inverted-U EKC is that when regions reach a sufficiently high income level, people living in these regions will demand cleaner environments (and, these regions also have the necessary institutions to enforce extant environmental rules); thus, emissions decline as income increases beyond this point. See De Bruyn and Heintz (1999) for a review.
Our strategy is to first estimate EKCs using fixed effects panel regression using data for 30 Chinese provinces from 1987 to 1995. 7 We end the data coverage of the EKC estimations in 1995 since a number of amendments to pollution laws were introduced after this year. This allows us to determine the trajectory of selected pollutants relative to income after 1995 if no changes to pollution policy occur (i.e., make off-sample predictions of pollution discharges using the estimated EKCs). We then compare these off-sample predictions to actual pollution discharges in 1996 to 2004 to partly quantify any effect pollution policy changes may have had on emissions. To put the current study in perspective, the environmental consequences of economic growth and policy responses to environmental problems since the establishment of the People's
Republic of China are briefly described in the next section. In Section III, a detailed description of the data and empirical methodology used are provided. The results are analyzed in section IV.
Concluding remarks are presented in the last section.
II. Pollution and Environmental Policy in China
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, environmental degradation has accompanied economic growth. During the Great Leap Forward (1958) (1959) (1960) ), people's communes were established in rural China. Trees were cut and used as fuel to make steel, causing a reduction in forest coverage. During the Cultural Revolution (1966) (1967) (1968) (1969) (1970) (1971) (1972) (1973) (1974) (1975) (1976) , farmers in the communes were mobilized to build terra fields in mountains to increase arable farmland, damaging the green coverage of mountains. 8 During the period of economic reforms that started in 1978, communes were dissolved and farmers and herdsmen were given freedom to engage in industrial production. SOEs became profit-oriented and private enterprises emerged. Using mostly outdated technologies, the emergence of these enterprises increased pollution in China substantially.
8 Also see Edmonds (1999 Since a number of environmental laws were amended after 1995, we study the time path of various pollutants in two periods : 1987-1995 and 1996-2004. Data are downloadable at www.worldbank.org/nipr/data/china/status.htm. The data compiled by the-pipe." P2 refocuses pollution control efforts to the early stages of production whereby firms are encouraged to use production techniques that prevent pollution at the source. 14 Industrial COD is the most important water pollutant in China (Wang and Wheeler 2003) ; and, is commonly used as a measure of water quality. Sulfur dioxide is of concern because it contributes to acid rain. It is released primarily from burning fuels that contain sulfur (e.g., coal Table 2 . For the most part, Tibet is the cleanest province while Liaoning is the dirtiest province. The Southwest region is the cleanest region while the Northeast region is the dirtiest one. 15 Coastal provinces are dirtier-in four of the six pollution media, the mean rank of coastal provinces range from 17 (waste gas) to 22 (industrial COD) while the mean rank of non-coastal provinces range from 11 (industrial COD) to 14 (SO 2 ). Non-coastal provinces ranked higher (dirtier) on average for smoke and industrial dust. Northern provinces ranked higher (dirtier) in all pollution media except industrial waste water. The mean ranks for Northern provinces range from 14 (industrial waste water) to 22 (smoke). For Southern provinces, the mean ranks range from 9 (smoke) to 17 (industrial waste water). Table 3 contains the Spearman rank correlation coefficients of the various pollutants for 1987-1995. The rank correlations range from 0.02 (industrial COD and industrial dust) to 0.83 (waste gas and smoke). Not surprisingly, the rank correlations are high among the various types of gas pollutants but low between water and gas pollutants. Also, although provinces with high 15 Shanghai is the dirtiest province and the Central and South region is the cleanest region if median ranks are used instead of mean ranks.
water quality also tend to have high air quality, this relationship is not that strong (the rank correlation between industrial waste water and waste gas is 0.38).
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Empirical Methodology
The following one-way fixed effects panel model is estimated:
where i indexes provinces and t indexes time; poll it is one of the six pollutants measured in per capita terms in 1987 to 1995; income is real per capita gross regional product for province i at time t; β, γ, and δ are coefficient parameters; α i are province-specific fixed effects; 17 and, ε ij is a well-behaved error term. We also estimate a quadratic specification for comparison.
We do realize that besides income, a number of other factors, such as environmental regulations, output composition, and the relative importance of state-owned enterprises, may affect pollution emissions across provinces. 18 However, these factors are somehow related to income; thus, following standard practice (see e.g., List and McHone 2000; Millimet et al. 2003) 16 Gas pollution in China is mostly from the use of coal and wood as fuels and from automobiles, while water pollution is mainly from pulp and paper, metallurgical, and chemical factories (see Naughton 2007) . In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the environmental issue had not been emphasized. Thus, provinces with more water polluting industries might have higher levels of water pollution, while provinces with more air polluting industries might have more air pollution. In addition, the water distribution in China is largely uneven. There is a shortage of surface and underground water in the northern part of China. For example, in Beijing, we will only see air pollution not much water pollution, since the Yongding River in Beijing has dried up. However, if we just look at the southern part, we may find a closer correlation between air and water pollution, i.e., less developed areas have less water and air pollution, while developed areas such as Shanghai have both high water and air pollution. 17 The province-specific fixed effects capture unmeasured locational attributes or attributes that are non-time varying (e.g., north/south or coast/non-coast location) during the period of analysis. 18 See Dasgupta et al. (2002) for a review.
we exclude these other factors from equation (1) to focus on the total effect of income on emissions. Table 4 contains the empirical results. 20 F-tests indicate the inclusion of province-specific fixed effects is appropriate as the null hypothesis that the province-specific fixed effects are the same is rejected at the one percent significance level (the F statistic range from 4.56 to 137.71 for the cubic specification). Hausman tests of the null hypothesis that province characteristics are uncorrelated with income are also rejected in four of the models at the one percent significance level (for the cubic model, the Hausman test statistic range from 3.12 to 93.02). This is indicative of the appropriateness of using the fixed effects model (versus the random effects model). The one-way fixed effects model controls for unmeasured province characteristics whereas the one-way random effects model treats these unmeasured characteristics as a component of the error term (see Greene 2000 , for details). We focus on the results for four pollutants below: total industrial waste water, industrial COD, waste gas, and industrial dust. This is because at least one of the income terms is statistically significant in all models dealing with these four pollutants. We also focus on the results from the cubic regressions (column (2) in Table 4 ) as the cubic term is statistically significant in the regressions for these four pollutants. The (within group) R-square values of these models range from 0.10 to 0.41.
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IV. Analysis of Results
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Estimated Environmental Kuznets Curves
Substituting the estimated coefficients into equation (1), the estimated per capita emission values can be determined. Figure 1A contains the actual and estimated values of the industrial waste water per capita discharge from 1987 to 1995. 22 Although the cubic term is statistically significant, the coefficient estimate of the linear term for income dominates both the coefficient estimates of the square and cubic income terms. That is, the estimated industrial waste water per capita discharge declines with a rise in real income.
The actual and estimated values of the industrial COD per capita discharge appear in Figure 1B . A turning point in the estimated income-emission regression is evident here. A per capita discharge peak is observed at per capita income 556 yuan (in 1950 prices). According to the estimated income-emission regression, industrial COD per capita emission is expected to decline as per capita income increases up to 3,291 yuan (the maximum real per capita income observed during the period). This is consistent with Wang and Wheeler's (2003) finding that COD pollution intensity across China's provinces declined between 1987-89 and 1992-1995.
The authors attribute this to increases in the pollution levy rates as income increase. As they 21 A two-way fixed effects panel is also estimated. In three of the models (industrial waste water, waste gas, and industrial dust), results indicate the appropriateness of including the time-specific fixed effects. These time effects capture unmeasured macroeconomic factors (e.g., change in environmental laws emanating from the central government) that all provinces experience. However, when the time effects are included, the income variables (linear, square, and cubic terms) lose their significance. This suggests that the effects of changes in macroeconomic factors dominate those of changes in income as far as these types of emissions are concerned. With this result in mind, we focus on the one-way fixed effects panel results since income is an important variable in the EKC regressions. 22 To focus on the relationship between income and emissions, unless indicated otherwise, all estimated values referred to in the paper exclude the estimated province-specific fixed effects.
suggest, "[t]he locally enforced price of pollution rises steadily with development because enforcement capacity and community valuation of damage both increase." (p. 466)
The coefficient estimate of the linear term for income once again dominates those of the square and cubic terms in the waste gas per capita discharge regression. From Figure 1C , we observe that emission per capita is expected to increase with real income. This result is consistent with those found by De Groot et al. (2004) who use a slightly longer data series (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) for
Chinese provinces. They also find that waste gas increase monotonically with per capita income.
Two turning points are evident in the estimated industrial dust per capita discharge regression, see Figure 1D . For the per capita income (at the 1950 constant price) range observed between 1987 and 1995, we see a per capita emission trough at 1,295 yuan and peak at 2,505
yuan. These suggest that per capita emission at first decreases as per capita income increases up to 1,295 yuan; emission then increases with income, and reach its maximum at per capita income of 2,505 yuan; and, emission is expected to decrease as income increases up to the observe maximum per capita income of 3,291 yuan. The estimated cubic EKC for industrial waste water predicts a decline in per capita emission as income increases up to the observed maximum real per capita income level of 8,343
yuan. In fact, the model predicts negative per capita emissions when income reaches around 3,000 yuan. Practically, this result suggests that if no changes occur (in the income-emission relationship), industrial waste water emissions per capita is expected to be negligible at around 3,000 yuan. 24 Figure 2A contains the actual and off-sample predictions (using the average province-specific fixed effects) excluding 22 observations with negative predicted values.
The estimated cubic EKC (using the average province-specific fixed effects) for industrial dust also predicts a decline in per capita industrial dust discharge as income increases beyond 3,291 yuan; and, per capita industrial dust discharge is also expected to be insignificant at around 3,280 yuan. Observations with negative predicted values are excluded in Figure 2B .
Although the estimated EKC for industrial COD indicates that per capita industrial COD discharge declines as income increases up to 3,291 yuan (see Figure 1B) , we see from Figure 2C that the estimated EKC for industrial COD (using the average province-specific fixed effects)
show a rise in per capita discharge as income increases beyond 3,291 yuan (the observed maximum per capita income in the 1987-1995 period).
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Note that the estimates in Figures 2A to 2C also assume that the province-specific fixed effects remain the same between 1996 and 2004. Recall that the province-specific fixed effects EKC by limiting the data period to 1987 to 1995. To address this issue, we also estimate EKCs for these three pollutants using data for the entire 1987-2004 period. The results are qualitatively similar to those using the shorter sample-industrial waste water pollution increases then declines with an increase in income; industrial COD pollution declines and increases with an increase in income; and, the industrial dust estimated EKC flattens; however, it still predicts a decline in emissions as income increases. 24 This translates to 19,809 yuan in 2004 prices; this is roughly US $2,390 at an exchange rate of 8.2768 yuan per US dollar. 25 We exclude observations with real income per capita greater than 5,000 yuan in Figure 2C to highlight the curvature in the estimated EKC. Actual data for these five observations are significantly lower than the predicted values.
for the most part capture the effect of unmeasured locational attributes; the effect of other factors that either did not or changed very little during the period of analysis (e.g., north/south location; local authorities' attitude towards pollution) are also subsumed in the province-specific fixed effects. Thus, the predicted values in Figures 2A to 2C are calculated also assuming that the province-specific fixed effects remain the same between 1996 and 2004. That is, the off-sample predictions are based on a counter-factual-the relationship between income and emissions and the factors that are subsumed in the province-specific fixed effects remain the same (or changed very little) after 1995.
It is evident from Figure 2A that actual industrial waste water per capita discharge increases with income-this is opposite of the prediction of the EKC. This suggests that despite policies enacted by the Chinese government after 1995, 26 perhaps these have not been stringent enough to bring the per capita discharge levels down to the level provided by the estimated EKC.
Besides the adoption of stricter environmental rules, structural changes (e.g., sectoral changes in output) experienced by the Chinese economy between 1996 and 2004 could have contributed to the observed emission pattern. 27 The emission-income relationships observed here is less likely due to structural changes. This is because large structural changes (i.e., shift to secondary industries) occurred in the early 1990s not after 1995. Actual industrial dust per capita discharge rates are larger than the predicted per capita discharge rates for most of the provinces between 1996 and 2004, see Figure 2B . This is inconsistent with the notion that given the adoption of stricter environmental regulations, actual emissions should be lower than the EKC predictions because the latter assumes no changes in environmental regulations. Although, it should be noted that actual per capita emissions are closer to the predicted per capita emission values at income levels beyond 2,000 yuan. And, a negative income-emission relationship is observed in the actual data.
Policies enacted to lower industrial COD pollution discharge appear to have been partly successful. 28 That is, although actual per capita industrial COD pollution discharge rates are higher than the predicted EKC discharge rates (see Figure 2C ), the differences are for the most part not large and actual emissions rates have not increased with income as the estimated EKC model predicts. According to Wang and Wheeler (2005) , industrial COD pollution is considered the most important water pollutant in China and has been monitored very closely by the Chinese environmental regulators. In fact, mass-based limits on industrial COD was included in the Ninth
Five Year Plan for Environmental Protection and Long Term Targets for the Year 2010 passed in 1996 (see Ma and Ortolano 2000).
The above conclusions though need to be qualified. This is because the off-sample predictions were calculated assuming that the effect of factors that are subsumed in the provincespecific fixed effects on emissions remain the same (or changed very little) after 1995. If these are not the case, then the above conclusions may not be correct. To partly address this concern, we also estimate a cubic EKC for the three pollutants using 1996-2004 data. We find that the structures of the fixed effects in the first (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) and second (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) 
Auxiliary Regressions
Although China's State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA) sets effluent standards, local governments have the right to set stricter standards. 29 Thus, local conditions will have an influence on how stringent pollution prevention and control policies are. It was suggested earlier that the province-specific fixed effects could be related to provincial authorities' attitudes towards pollution control independent of income levels. Since the estimated fixed effects are parametric shifts, larger values indicate higher pollution discharge rates which could have resulted from less willingness to control pollution.
We test a number of additional hypotheses using the estimated province-specific fixed effects. In particular, we ask if the estimated province-specific fixed effects (which we take to be related to a province's commitment to control pollution) are related to a number of characteristics such as a province's north/south and coast/non-coast location, unemployment rate, urbanization rate, and industrial structure. These fixed effects may also be related to the relative 29 See Muldavin (2000) , Ma and Ortolano (2000) , and Economy (2004) for details.
importance of state-owned enterprises and foreign direct investment (FDI) in a province's economy; and, whether the provincial government is running a budget surplus/deficit. The following auxiliary regression model is estimated:
where α i are the estimated province-specific fixed effects from equation (1), regressors included in Z i are province attributes hypothesized to be related to emission levels and commitment to pollution control; and, υ i is a well-behaved error term.
The raw data clearly show that northern and coastal provinces are dirtier, thus we include a province's location in the auxiliary regression. Since the problems caused by unemployment are immediate and visible while the problems caused by pollution may not be immediate and are less visible, provinces with higher unemployment rates are expected to be dirtier and may be less willing to enforce environmental protection laws. Urbanization may reduce pollution since urban areas have better sanitary facilities and people in urban areas usually use gas instead of coal.
However, urbanization normally is accompanied by industrialization. More industries imply higher industrial pollution. Therefore, the correlation between the urbanization rate (proxied by population density) and emissions is ambiguous.
Provinces with a larger share of their output originating from secondary industries which includes manufacturing are expected to be more polluted than provinces with a smaller output share from secondary industries. The managers of China's SOEs are appointed by the central government. Thus, they may be more willing to follow pollution control rules. These enterprises also tend to have access to better pollution control technologies than other types of enterprises.
Therefore, provinces with a larger share of their output coming from the SOEs are expected to have lower emissions. Since most foreign enterprises in China are from developed countries and these firms tend to have superior and cleaner technologies, provinces receiving relatively more FDI are expected to be cleaner. Lester and Lombard (1990) argue that administrative units with greater fiscal resources may be more inclined to regulate pollution. This is because they are less dependent on polluters for tax revenues. In China, fiscal revenue shortage is the major obstacle for local government enforcement of environmental protection laws. Thus, provinces experiencing relatively large budget deficits are expected to be more polluted and may be less willing to control pollution.
To mitigate potential endogeneity between the estimated province-specific fixed effects and the above mentioned regressors, we use the average values of these regressors in 1982-1986.
In other words, since the effects of these factors may also be subsumed in the estimated province-specific fixed effects, these variables are measured in periods prior to 1987. Also, since the province-specific fixed effects capture unmeasured province characteristics that either did not or changed very little, these variables should also not vary too much in each province. Some of these variables did not vary too much in each province. For example, the coefficients of variation for population density range from 1.3% (Jilin) to 4.5% (Beijing). The share of secondary industries to total regional output and the share of state-owned enterprises to total industrial output are also quite stable in most of the provinces. The provinces, however, experienced large changes in the rate of unemployment, the size of the budget surplus/deficit, and FDI relative to total regional output. For example, the coefficients of variation for the rate of unemployment range from 4.5% (Guangdong) to 69.4% (Beijing).
The estimates for the full model appear in column (1) of Table 5 . There is no indication of a misspecification, multicollinearity, or heteroskedasticity problem. The fit of the models are quite good and ranges from 59% to 62%. Controlling for income, northern provinces, provinces with lower population densities, and provinces with smaller secondary industries shares have lower per capita industrial waste water pollution; industrial COD emissions per capita are lower in less urbanized areas; and, coastal provinces, provinces with larger secondary industries shares, and provinces experiencing smaller budget surpluses (or larger budget deficits) have larger industrial dust emissions per capita.
Table 5 near here
Since the rate of unemployment, the size of the budget balance and FDI relative to total output experienced large changes in most provinces, we exclude them from equation (2). The results appear in column (2) of Table 5 . For the most part, the results for the remaining variables are qualitatively similar to those in column (1) for industrial waste water and industrial dust.
Coast, secondary industries share, and SOEs share are now statistically significant in the industrial COD regression. Non-coastal provinces, provinces with smaller secondary industries shares, and smaller SOEs shares have lower industrial COD pollution per capita discharge rates.
The latter is consistent with Wang and Wheeler's (2003) finding that state-owned plants are more pollution intensive. As a robustness check, we also test for the presence of influential observations using DFITS, Cook's distance, and Welsch Distance. We exclude observations (Shanghai and Guangdong for the first two pollutants; and only Shanghai in industrial dust)
when at least two of these tests identify them as influential observations. The estimates appear in column (3). Population density loses significance in the industrial waste water and industrial COD regressions but become significant in the industrial dust regression. The results for the remaining variables are qualitatively similar.
Overall, the results indicate that provinces in the north have lower levels of industrial waste water pollution, after controlling for income. Northern provinces do not have much water resources, i.e., water is much more precious for them compared to the southern provinces, and therefore, they may be more interested in controlling water pollution. Non-coastal provinces and provinces with smaller secondary industries shares have lower levels of all three types of pollutants. Contrary to expectations, provinces with higher state-owned enterprises shares have higher levels of industrial COD pollution. Finally, there is also some evidence that a province's industrial dust pollution level is related to its budget balance. Industrial dust is a local public "bad;" thus, local governments may have more incentives to regulate this pollutant. Therefore, administrative units with greater fiscal resources may be more inclined to regulate industrial dust pollution.
V. Concluding Remarks
This paper estimated environmental Kuznets curves using 1987-1995 data for Chinese Finally, provide incentives to local governments for environmental protection. Kahn and Yardley 2007) . Perhaps rather than using green GDP to measure local government officials' performance, a system rewarding those able to achieve targeted emission reductions would be more acceptable.
Data Appendix
Data used in equation (2) are collected from China Compendium of Statistics 1949 Statistics -2004 Unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of the registered unemployed persons to the labor force in urban areas. Population density is the number of people per square kilometer.
Secondary share (in percent) is the share of secondary industry output to the total regional product. Secondary industry includes mining and quarrying, manufacturing, production and supply of electricity, water and gas, and construction. State enterprises share (in percent) is the size of the gross industrial output of state-owned enterprises to gross industrial output of all enterprises in the province. FDI share (in percent) is the size of actually used foreign direct investment to the region's total output. Budget balance share (in percent) is the size of the budget balance relative to the region's total output. Budget balance is the difference between the local government general revenue and expenditure. 1987-1995 and 1996-2004 are significantly different at the 99% confidence level. 
